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Enforcing higher labour standards within developing country value chains: 
consequences for MNEs and informal actors in a dual economy 
 
Abstract: The 2013 Rana Plaza disaster led external stakeholders to insist on higher labour standards in apparel 
global value chains (GVCs). Stakeholders now expect MNEs to take ‘full-chain’ responsibility. However, the 
increased monitoring and enforcement costs of a large network of suppliers have been non-trivial. MNEs instead 
implement a ‘cascading compliance’ approach, coupled with a partial re-internalization. Elevated costs are 
further exacerbated in developing countries where the informal and formal sector are linked, and cost 
competitiveness greatly depends on this duality. Monitoring actors in the informal sector is difficult, and few 
informal actors can achieve compliance. GVCs have therefore reduced informal sector engagement by 
excluding non-compliant actors and investing in greater automation. By seeking to strictly enforce compliance, 
MNEs are attenuating some of the positive effects of MNE investment, particularly the prospects for 
employment creation (especially among women), and enterprise growth in the informal sector. I discuss how 
these observations might inform other cross-disciplinary work in development, ethics, and sociology. Finally, I 
note implications for IB theory from the disparities between the ownership, control and responsibility 
boundaries of the firm. 
 
INTRODUCTION  
Sometimes key contemporary real-world phenomena have significant and long-term implications for 
society. These effects may not be immediately observable in the shorter term, and their direct 
relevance to international business (IB) not always obvious. However, as Buckley, Doh & Benischke 
(2017) emphasise, if IB scholarship is to remain relevant to policy it is incumbent on scholars to 
consider phenomenon-driven topics more carefully, while also adopting a broader, more multi-
disciplinary view. The phenomenon that is the catalyst for this paper is the Rana Plaza Disaster in 
Bangladesh. In 2013, over 1100 workers died when the Rana Plaza building collapsed. Although this 
was neither an isolated incident nor an unusual occurrence (in Bangladesh or elsewhere in the 
developing world), it drew global attention to the poor working conditions within apparel global value 
chains (GVCs), many of which are controlled by multinational enterprises (MNEs). It acted as a 
‘focusing event’, or a ‘shock’ that mobilised external and internal stakeholders across the spectrum to 
push for institutional and organizational change across an entire industry, and forced a series of 




For this paper, the Rana Plaza incident is significant for what it represents more generally: it is a point 
of inflection in the public awareness of the ethics of outsourcing, across a broad range of industries. 
There are now a variety of public and private initiatives (involving buyers, MNEs, local firms, unions, 
governments, as well as foreign and domestic non-governmental organizations (NGOs)) to address 
improved working conditions through a number of mechanisms. I focus specifically on the increased 
monitoring and enforcement of working conditions (particularly those associated with labour 
standards) in apparel GVCs. The way in which GVCs in the apparel industry (and other similar 
sectors) are organised across the world has changed, and continues to evolve, with controversial 
implications as a (multidisciplinary) literature conveys (see e.g., Mezzadri (2014); Lund-Thomsen & 
Nadvi (2010); Williams, Shahid & Martinez (2016); Nadvi (2017); Giuliani (2017); Short, Toffel & 
Hugill (2016); Hemphill & White (2018)).   
Greater scrutiny has acted to force MNEs (which are the lead firms within apparel GVCs) to address 
concerns about ‘sweatshop’ type behaviour by their suppliers, and radically alter the governance 
mechanisms of labour practices within their GVCs. Prior to the focusing event, lead firms utilized 
‘direct contract reasoning’, taking responsibility only for its immediate (tier 1) suppliers, to whom 
they are contractually bound (and with whom there was active coordination and control). The new 
consensus pushes MNEs to accept greater responsibility for the labour practices of all the actors 
within their associated chain (Schrempf-Stirling & Palazzo, 2014) in what is known as a ‘full-chain 
approach’ (Humphrey, 2014) even where there are no direct commercial links to the lead firm.  
This is easier said than done. In practice, there is considerable variation in the degree to which MNEs 
have succeeded in achieving full-chain responsibility (KnowTheChain, 2018).  
Applying a transaction cost and internalization theory perspective (e.g., Narula & Verbeke, 2015), I 
discuss why achieving more effective compliance in GVCs leads to greater de facto vertical 
integration and automation. This reflects a need to balance the potential reputational damage against 
the rising transaction costs of monitoring and enforcing labour standards across a complex network of 
suppliers. More significantly, the associated increased transaction costs of such extensive monitoring 
within a large network of suppliers are non-trivial. MNEs choose instead to implement what can best 
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be described as ‘cascading compliance’, coupled with a degree of re-internalization. This approach 
does not require radically altering the structure of the GVC, and the distribution of rents within it, 
while mitigating the cost of engaging directly with a sprawling network of actors. Cascading 
compliance permits MNEs (‘lead firms’) to continue to exert greater control over the activities of their 
immediate (tier 1) suppliers, while also dictating how tier 1 suppliers engage with their own suppliers. 
Tier 1 firms, in turn, are expected to do exert similar control over their tier 2 suppliers (and their 
outsourcing arrangements), and so on.  
The costs of full-chain responsibility are even higher in developing countries, where GVCs typically 
rely on actors and resources from both the formal and the (large) informal sector to achieve low costs. 
Formal suppliers are intricately linked to informal sector suppliers, and also depend on informally 
employed unskilled labour. The mechanisms by which formal and informal suppliers interact are 
complex, in part because institutions binding them are also informal, and because the actors 
themselves in a constant state of flux. This makes full-chain responsibility even more cost-prohibitive 
(and cascading responsibility more attractive).  
The second contribution of this paper relates more directly to the informal/formal nexus, a defining 
feature of developing countries. The informal sector represents a paradox for policymakers. On the 
one hand, high levels of informality can underlay the cost competitiveness of labour-intensive 
production. Countries explicitly rely on MNEs for employment creation and skills upgrading (Narula 
& Pineli, 2019). Governments are aware that informal sector, as a source of low-cost inputs, is a 
significant beneficiary. On the other hand, governments also want to reduce informality, as high levels 
impede human and economic development. Development policies therefore also seek to effect the 
movement of actors away from the informal, and towards the formal sector. Governments want FDI 
because it creates jobs and raises incomes, and greater GVC participation provides such opportunities. 
While the informal/formal nexus lies at the heart of their cost competitiveness, it also perpetuates 
underdevelopment.  
Drawing from development studies, sociology and business ethics, I consider the consequences for 
country development from stricter enforcement of labour standards across GVC networks, especially 
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when networks straddle the formal and the informal sectors. Achieving greater compliance has 
adverse effects on the participation of informal actors, ordinarily the most economically and socially 
vulnerable segment of the economy. I discuss how MNEs, by seeking to more strictly enforce 
compliance throughout their affiliated supply chain (however benevolent their intentions), may 
attenuate some of the positive effects of MNE investment, particularly the prospects for employment 
creation (especially among women), and enterprise growth from the informal sector.  
My contribution is primarily conceptual, but because my intention is to draw attention to a real world 
phenomenon, I illustrate my arguments on how MNEs have changed their compliance practices using 
real-world evidence from Bangladesh to provide context to my analysis. I discuss how my 
observations might inform other cross-disciplinary work in development, ethics, and sociology. 
Finally, I note implications for IB theory from the disparities between the ownership, control and 
responsibility boundaries of the firm. 
 
GVCS AND THE INFORMAL SECTOR IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
All economies have an informal sector, although its role in developed economies is several orders of 
magnitude smaller than in developing countries: The share of informal employment in developed 
countries was 18.3% compared to 69.6% in developing countries in 2016 (ILO, 2018). Indeed, the 
pervasive role of the informal sector has spawned a significant literature on the ‘dual economy’ 
problem in development studies (Lewis 1954; Gollin 2014), because the persistence of high levels of 
informality (and a correspondingly small formal sector) can have detrimental effects on the prospects 
of economic growth in the longer run.  
At the same time, an informal sector can also be the source of comparative advantage, and a driver of 
growth in developing countries: it is a reservoir of surplus labour that is a key input to promote the 
expansion of the ‘modern’, knowledge-intensive sectors, which are associated with the formal 
economy. Most governments recognise that supporting the informal economy is important for 
addressing poverty and inequality (Chen, 2012). Social and economic development depends crucially 
on the capacity of the economy to effectively redeploy resources from the less efficient sectors 
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(typical of informal sectors) to more productive activities (more commonly associated with the formal 
sector). Early-stage industrial competitiveness often derives from the cross-utilization of the formal 
and the informal sectors, which function as a ‘system’ (Narula, 2018).  
However, while large informal sectors are a reality, when they are persistently large they impede 
development. The informal sector is predominantly populated by small enterprises or individual actors 
performing labour-intensive activities. Organizational skills, technological and managerial expertise 
are weak.  The informal sector is often associated with rural populations, but also with the urban poor 
(Godfrey 2011; Narula 2018). Among the key characteristics of informality are that individuals and 
enterprises are unregistered, unregulated by the state, and pay no taxes. As a consequence are unable 
to seek (formal) credit, are largely legally unprotected, and have limited access to social programmes 
and public goods. They tend to engage in low productivity activities, and few informal actors have 
access to the financial and knowledge capital to expand their activities or improve productivity. 
Individuals trapped in the informal sector tend to be undernourished, less educated with shorter 
lifespans, with fewer opportunities to escape poverty (La Porta & Shleifer, 2008). Estimates of the 
share of the population in the informal economy are high as 88% in South Asia, with 83.4% of 
employers and 64.5% of employees being informal (ILO, 2018). Perhaps more than any other region, 
South Asia has historically had an especially intricate intertwining of the formal and informal sector. 
The economic policies of countries seek simultaneously to exploit the cost competitiveness that a 
large informal sector can provide, while also promoting greater participation of informal actors in the 
formal economy. This second goal is more challenging: greater formalization requires greater state 
intervention. Government failure (and regulatory capture) means that in practice, policy initiatives 
addressing informality are less effective (Chen & Doane, 2008). Nonetheless, it is well known that 
expanding commercial opportunities for smaller enterprises is key to rapid economic development 
(Maksimov, Wang & Luo, 2017). 
For the purposes of this paper, I emphasise four types of informality. The first is informal 
employment, where workers are employed by formal firms (registered commercial enterprises) on a 
casual, ad hoc basis (Perry et al, 2007). The second group are subsistence actors who include self-
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employed workers such as housewives that undertake ad hoc work in their own premises (Banerjee & 
Duflo, 2007). They play a key role in ‘jobbing’ by taking on piecework. Informal and subsistence 
employment (collectively referred to as ‘vulnerable employment’) can perpetuate poverty (Barrientos, 
Gereffi & Rossi, 2011). Such employees have no contracts or employee rights. 31.8% of workers in 
the formal sector are informally employed in Bangladesh, although the proportion is as high as 86% 
for women (ILO 2018). Informal employees tend to be less well paid, are less likely to receive 
training, and have limited path for advancement (Das, 2012). Formally employed workers are able to 
acquire new skills and potentially earn higher wages, with a variety of benefits. 
The third type of informality is in the form of informal enterprises, which engage in coordinated 
commercial activity, but are not legally registered as commercial entities (Al‐Mataani, Wainwright & 
Demirel, 2017). A fourth type of informality are a specific type of informal enterprise best described 
as the bazaar trader. These are not simply ‘firms’ who have no legal status, but are without a 
discernible organisational structure, regular operations, workforce or facilities (Geertz, 1963; Guha-
Khasnobis, Kanbur & Ostrom, 2006). Such enterprises are built around an actor/entrepreneur who 
organises who engages in a series of frequent spot market transactions with workers, suppliers and 
customers as and when a market opportunity arises, with each incarnation of the enterprise having a 
finite lifetime for the duration of the transaction. 
Informal enterprises are unable to grow beyond micro-or small size, because they cannot borrow from 
formal lenders and are unable to do participate in legal contracts (McGahan, 2012). Informal 
enterprises are unlikely to afford productivity-enhancing equipment, upgrade workers’ skills, achieve 
economies of scale, and have limited access to public goods and services (La Porta & Shleifer, 2008).  
Informal enterprises often have lower costs than their formal counterparts, as they do not pay taxes, 
and have few payroll-related costs. All their ‘employees’ are casual workers. Informal enterprises pay 
workers considerably less than formal firms. In Bangladesh, workers in the informal sector earn three 
times less than their formal counterparts (ILO, 2013). They do not engage with regulatory 
requirements (such as labour standards compliance), because this requires resources they do not 
possess. The exclusion from regulation is also a source of cost competitiveness. Regulatory costs can 
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be especially high in locations with weak formal institutions, high levels of bureaucracy, or endemic 
corruption (Schneider & Enste, 2013). 
For the most part, GVCs have been a positive force for economic development (UNCTAD, 2013) 
because they have created employment and wealth-creation opportunities amongst the more 
vulnerable members of society. In particular, the engagement of the informal sector by GVCs has 
been welcomed, especially where actors are located in economically and socially backward locations, 
helping people escape the poverty trap (Giuliani, Pietrobelli & Rabellotti, 2005). Through GVCs, 
MNEs have exploited the cost advantages that the informal/formal nexus offers, and have the 
immediate outcome of expanding job-creation. Any work is better than no work at all, even if it is 
underpaid and under poor conditions, and new swathes of employment opportunities have arisen, 
prompting greater participation of women and other marginalised actors. Over the last two decades, 
GVCs have also been instrumental in creating opportunities for entrepreneurial activity and increased 
knowledge transfer within both the formal and informal sectors, in addition to greater employment 
(Pietrobelli & Rabellotti, 2011). The fittest informal enterprises engaged with GVCs often move 
towards formality, and rising steadily towards higher value adding activity through GVC 
participation.  
 
APPAREL GVCS IN A PRE-RANA PLAZA ERA: DIRECT CONTRACT REASONING 
The structure of the apparel industry in most developing countries has a hierarchy built around three 
levels1. The first of these is the first-tier (formal) supplier, who engage directly with the lead firms. 
The second layer involves both formal firms and informal enterprises. They are smaller actors who 
supply a variety of first-tier companies. The third layer is generally always informal, engaging 
directly with both first and second-tier firms. They are usually single-unit specialised actors doing 
washing, printing, embroidery dyeing, etc., either in informal workshops, or by workers at home. 
(Mezzadri, 2014). The third layer includes actors engaged in ‘specialist’ work. This is normally 
labour-intensive, while also requiring human dexterity or customisation such as embroidery or 
lacework. Most of this third layer involves informal/subsistence actors, often women, working from 
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home on small batches, or at informal enterprises, sometimes in remote locations, paid on a per-item 
basis (Mezzadri, 2016). The supply of low-cost labour in a developing country is near-infinite, with 
considerable movement of surplus labour from the rural areas to urban locations, where employment 
in the informal sector provides opportunities less dependent on the vagaries of small-scale agriculture. 
When the informal sector is characterised by high unemployment, working below minimum wage is 
better than not working at all (Günther & Launov, 2012). To paraphrase Lewis (1954), in the absence 
of labour rights, a near-inexhaustible supply of labour keeps wage costs low, with workers as price-
takers.   
The majority of apparel GVCs in developing countries are MNE-led, many of which are large-scale 
retailers with brands and labels. Few, if any, have equity control over their first-tier suppliers, relying 
on non-equity governance modes to maintain control. The majority of first-tier suppliers tend to be 
locally owned firms, all of which are formal, and some of which have their own retailing 
infrastructure. In the logic of ‘direct-contract reasoning’, how (and with whom) the first tier suppliers 
choose to engage with is a matter for them to decide.  Thus, engagement with the informal sector is 
removed from the purview of the lead firm, providing ‘plausible deniability’ for the sourcing 
decisions of its lower tier (formal) suppliers. Likewise, the internal enforcement of labour standards 
within tier 1 suppliers is rarely monitored by the MNE as long as the supplier meets with public 
regulatory requirements. Indeed, the cost competitiveness of the apparel sector in a dual economy 
relies on the informal economy’s exclusion from regulatory requirements. Neither public nor private 
regulators are effectively able to monitor this wide network of indirect suppliers and pieceworkers.  
From the lead firm’s economic perspective, direct contract reasoning in a dual economy can be close 
to optimally efficient. The network of informal enterprises are engaged with first-tier suppliers 
without contracts, and are essentially market transactions (although some may be regular suppliers). 
For tier 1 suppliers, there are several cost advantages of utilising informal suppliers and employees. 
First, the use of informal enterprises has the benefit of lower unit costs, as they have no outlays 
associated with regulation, safety, health, and labour rights. Indeed, in the lower layers, piecework 
lowers costs even further when it is performed by subsistence workers at home. Second, informal-
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formal supplier ‘contracts’ are almost always batch-specific, short-term agreements. By relying on 
such agreement, the customer have no fixed costs associated with increased installed capacity during 
periods of surges in demand, or subsequent costs of slack capacity during market slumps. The 
informal sector is thus an important ‘valve’ for the formal suppliers. During periods of peak demand, 
informal enterprises take on tasks for which the formal firm has insufficient capacity (Liddick, 2011; 
Webb et al, 2014). Third, Tier 1 suppliers can utilise informal employees as a further cost-saving 
because they are casual workers, often with no minimum wage requirement, working long hours 
without overtime. The informal economy as a ‘reservoir of surplus labour’ is especially useful in the 
apparel industry, where demand is cyclical. Both formal and informal enterprises tend to operate on 
thin margins (as price-takers within the GVC). At the extreme, they can employ children and women 
(who are paid even less). 
These ‘regular’ informal and de facto suppliers are complemented by buying houses and agents that 
act as intermediaries or ‘match makers’ (Labowitz & Bauman-Pauly, 2014, 2015). Buying houses are 
formal firms that do not have a dedicated supply chain, and accept batch orders from a variety of 
domestic and international customers, choosing different configurations of suppliers depending upon 
the order. They provide opportunities for the industry as a whole to maximise efficiency, by placing 
orders with actors with surplus capacity who are keen to maintain economies of scale.  
On the other hand, agents are informal boundary spanners, who have an intricate knowledge of the 
available actors and prices in the informal economy. Agents are intermediaries, similar to bazaar 
traders, with no production assets of their own. The informal economy is opaque, and agents help to 
reduce the search costs for formal firms, further minimising transaction costs for the GVC when they 
choose to use them. Agents also operate opaquely, making it difficult to monitor if they are compliant 
(Alexander, 2018; Mezzadri, 2014).  
 
WHY MNES FIND FULL-CHAIN COMPLIANCE DIFFICULT 
The aftermath of the Rana Plaza Disaster saw a variety of multilateral, bilateral, public and private 
initiatives across the world to improve labour standards in the apparel industry (see Sinkovics, Hoque 
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& Sinkovics, 2016; Schuessler et al 2019; Fontana & Egels-Zandén 2018). Although there is some 
variation between countries, most public regulatory efforts have ultimately been limited in nature. 
Developing countries rarely have the capacity to effectively enforce higher labour standards, even 
when new legislation is created (James et al, 2018). In general, labour standards are rarely a priority 
for governments, compared to attracting FDI and addressing key economic problems, such as endemic 
unemployment and poverty. Governments ‘soften’ the implementation of regulation for investments 
that may have socially desirable outcomes (Davies & Vadlamannati 2013). However, the widespread 
media coverage after Rana Plaza placed governments that rely on labour-intensive FDI in a bind: the 
negative publicity of low standards dilutes the attractiveness of a host country for MNEs (Jones-
Henry, 2018), but enforcing higher labour standards reduces their appeal to cost-conscious investors.  
External stakeholders have sought to complement weak public regulation with private regulation 
(Locke, Rissing & Pal, 2013; Fransen & Burgoon, 2017). Private regulation refers to ‘soft’ institutions 
that are shaped by private actors, primarily standards developed with or by external stakeholders and 
NGOs. These are motivated by the notion that the MNE as the dominant actor in the GVC can 
(passively or actively) improve labour standards across its supplier network (Davies & Vadlamannati, 
2013).  
It is important to emphasise that full-chain accountability within GVCs has not been driven by its 
constituent firms for economic or strategic reasons, but by external stakeholders (Schrempf-Stirling & 
Palazzo 2014). MNEs are aware that there are considerable reputation costs should they not be seen to 
have ethical sourcing practices, especially for those MNEs for whom reputation is a key FSA (Wang 
& Li 2019). This is especially so for branded apparel MNEs. 
From the MNE’s perspective, the shift to greater responsibility flies in the face of the previous 
dominant narrative that led to the growth of GVCs and trend away from full internalization and 
hierarchies. The GVC was superior to hierarchical governance modes because it reduced transaction 
costs through the flexible use of arms-length network of suppliers. The economic logic was fairly 
strong: quasi-internalization allowed the MNE maintain the control boundaries of the firm, even as 
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the ownership boundaries receded. Direct contract reasoning and the modern GVC are inextricably 
linked – greater accountability and control is normally associated with greater vertical integration.  
Full-chain responsibility alters the economic feasibility of the GVC, but it is axiomatic that the long-
term sustainability of a GVC depends upon its ability to adapt to its ever-changing environment. 
Although the benefits of the GVC are reduced through greater compliance requirements, operating 
efficient supplier networks remains a key FSA of the MNE. Although full-chain compliance increased 
costs non-trivially, they are still able to achieve greater efficiency than a hierarchically organised, 
integrated firm (Kano, 2018). Increased costs in buyer-dominated GVCs are mitigated to some extent 
because returns at almost every stage of the value chain are determined by the lead firm (Kaplinsky, 
2005; Kaplinsky & Morris, 2001; Gereffi, 2014).  
Implementing a truly full-chain approach has a number of challenges. First, monitoring and 
enforcement requires active engagement, and this is costly across a large supplier network. Private 
regulatory mechanisms are often in the form of ethical standards/codes of conduct and factory audits, 
but these are not always reliable (Short et al, 2016), or indeed, affordable. Sophisticated technological 
solutions are available to MNEs in countries with the appropriate high-tech infrastructure. The small-
scale, capital-poor and labour-intensive nature of many actors in a developing country GVC do not 
allow for monitoring through IT systems integration. Under such circumstance, MNEs may prefer to 
rely on the cheaper option of monitoring through the certification of standards by third-party 
organizations (Short et al, 2016). This adds another layer of contractual agreements with such third-
parties to undertake the monitoring, and these actors may behave opportunistically (Locke et al, 2013, 
Schuessler et al, 2019).  
Second, it is relatively easy to monitor formal firms that have physical premises, and to enforce 
changes in practices within these suppliers when they are engaged through contracts. It is much more 
difficult (and costly) to monitor (or indeed identify) informal actors (which at the limit) potentially 
include thousands of women who perform piecework in their homes. Private regulation is particularly 
suitable for supply chains that are predominantly in the formal sector. Informal enterprises’ 
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participation in GVCs is quasi-contractual at best, but pragmatically speaking are essentially market 
relationships. 
Third, MNEs are rarely deeply embedded locally. To take full-chain responsibility the MNE must 
have an intimate understanding of societal structures, and navigating complex systems dominated by 
informal relationships means that MNE are even more boundedly rational. The MNE therefore has an 
incomplete knowledge of potential and current suppliers, even more so where the suppliers are 
informal.  
Fourth, even where MNEs are successful in monitoring the labour standards in the informal network, 
the MNE is faced with difficulties to enforce, and the supplier has difficulties in complying. The 
informal actor often has resource constraints that make investment in compliance impossible. Private 
regulation often requires certification by an independent agency for which there are charges, and 
informal actors can find that the costs of compliance outweigh the benefits. GVCs do not have the 
capacity to enforce standards in the absence of a contractual relationship. The MNE can ‘push’ the 
informal actors towards formalization by helping it to upgrade financially and technically, but doing 
so would require investment. In short, this would create a hierarchy of a number of previously-
informal actors (Narula, Asmussen, Chi & Kundu, 2019). Increased monitoring and enforcement costs 
in a pure full-chain compliance model therefore alters the transaction cost logic towards greater 
vertical integration. When margins are especially thin, lead firms may be willing to risk the use of 
more (reputationally) dubious (and non-compliant) suppliers.  
It would be wrong to generalise across the industry. MNEs that compete primarily on price behave 
differently from those with branded products (Schuessler et al, 2019). MNEs who prioritize low prices 
over ethical concerns are less concerned about full-chain compliance. Nonetheless, negative publicity 
matters, even for these firms, and many engage in some degree of compliance as consumers become 
more aware of these issues. Toffel, Short & Oullet (2015) find that suppliers whose primary 
customers are located in countries where consumers are wealthy and socially conscious tend to be 




A PRACTICAL COMPROMISE: CASCADING COMPLIANCE IN DUAL ECONOMIES 
In the previous sections I have highlighted how the shift from direct contract reasoning to full-chain 
responsibility affects the economic efficiency of MNE-led GVCs located in developing countries. My 
key argument is that this shift towards greater compliance disturbs the intricate intertwining of the 
informal sector with formal suppliers, a key source of the cost-competitiveness of the apparel sector. 
GVCs have seen a significant reorganization, as compliance requirements have altered the underlying 
transaction cost logic, and consequently, the propensity to internalise previously outsourced activities.  
True full-chain compliance is cost-prohibitive, and MNEs have instead evolved their GVCs to a 
‘cascading responsibility model’. The MNE takes the responsibility of directly monitoring and 
enforcing standards of its contractually obligated (and immediate) formal partners. MNEs monitor 
first-tier suppliers by regular inspections, in some cases embedding staff in critical factories, and 
linking their IT systems together. In turn, the first-tier suppliers are responsible for the compliance of 
their own suppliers. They must orchestrate and monitor all their immediate suppliers, including those 
in the informal economy. This cascades further, with the second tier actors being expected to take 
responsibility for the compliance of its suppliers, and so on.  
In this section, I further discuss how GVCs have used this cascading responsibility approach, 
supported by evidence from a fieldtrip to Bangladesh, which arguably has been at the epicentre of this 
shift. I conducted multiple open-ended interviews with a variety of stakeholders, including MNEs, 
government officials and firms, originally part of a larger study to understand upgrading in GVCs.   
Apparel accounts for well over 80% of Bangladesh’s exports, and 16% of its GDP, and has been 
central to its export-oriented, FDI-assisted development strategy. The majority of the GVCs are MNE-
led, most of which are large-scale retailers with brands and labels. The industry specializes in low-
value and mid-market price apparel.  
Most suppliers are locally owned firms and enterprises. The apparel sector relies heavily on the use of 
subcontracting to external, arms-length actors, both formal and informal. The industry formally 
employed over 4 million workers in 2017-18. No reliable estimates exist of the related informal and 
14 
 
subsistence employment, or those in informal enterprises, but it is likely to be at least equivalent in 
terms of employment. The majority of new jobs created in Bangladesh’s apparel industry since the 
1990s have been informal, with a significant share being women. The apparel industry has been 
instrumental in reducing poverty because many of these women are migrants from poor rural 
households (Kabeer & Mahmud, 2004). MNEs in Bangladesh have overwhelmingly adopted a 
cascading compliance approach by taking a series of deliberate actions. 
First, MNEs have transferred responsibility (and the cost) of greater levels of monitoring of other 
upstream actors to its tier 1 suppliers, while maintaining tight control of tier 1. Such a cascading of 
responsibilities reduces the risks of shirking, and addresses the bounded rationality problem.  
To an extent, this has suited the ambitions of many Tier 1 firms, who are interested in moving 
downstream and developing their own brands. They are therefore also keen to create a (positive) 
reputation. Besides, switching costs for the MNE are low, so failure by a tier 1 firm to accept the 
delegation of responsibility can lead to the loss of a client and income. MNEs often have parallel 
GVCs in several countries, and are able to shift production to wherever the associated GVC is most 
price competitive, so the onus is on the domestic suppliers to accept the increased monitoring role 
within the price/performance targets set by the lead firm (Surroca, Tribo & Zahra, 2013).  
Second, lead firms have placed restrictions on the use of non-compliant actors by suppliers. Thus, 
effectively, compliance has extended to second- and third-tier actors, with lead firms expecting tier 1 
suppliers to enforce labour standards with their own lower-tier suppliers (Alexander, 2018). Actors or 
enterprises who are not certified as compliant are excluded from the GVC. There has also been 
pressure to formalise employees, and use fewer informal, casual employees.  
The net effect has been that Tier 1 suppliers have also reorganised themselves in three ways: 
(1) They have truncated their supply chains and brought in-house activities that were previously 
outsourced, and acquired some of their less efficient competitors2. First-tier firms have thus achieved 
greater efficiency through economies of scale and scope, offsetting the costs of enforcing compliance 
of its suppliers (and the reputational risks of failing to do so effectively). Tier 1 and 2 formal firms 
15 
 
have also increased their vertical integration further by integrating towards fabric manufacture, as 
well as downstream, to branded apparel3. 
(2) They have eliminated the reliance on non-compliant formal firms and informal enterprises. 
Informal enterprises do not have the resources or knowledge to invest in safety equipment and 
organisational upgrading to achieve the various formal certifications required. Those informal 
enterprises with the resources to do so have moved into the formal sector. Both informal enterprises 
and smaller formal firms require considerable financial capital and professional management to 
implement acceptable quality control, IT and logistics systems (most MNEs now expect to be able to 
exchange information with their suppliers, so as to coordinate deliveries, quality-control and monitor 
various compliance protocols). About 18% of the formal firms of the garment sector officially 
registered after 2013, as demand for sub-contracting to informal firms fell (Moazzem, 2018).  
(3) First-tier suppliers have sought to reduce their costs (with the technical assistance of lead firms) by 
increasing productivity through greater investment in (labour-saving) machinery. More modern, 
automated production methods tend to be compliant with stricter labour standards. This has the 
knock-on effect of increasing the demand for skilled workers (and reducing the need for unskilled 
workers)4. In a developing country with a comparative advantage in labour, this has effectively raised 
its shadow price. 
Higher automation reduces opportunities for unskilled workers within first-tier suppliers, but also 
places upward pressure on wage bills as there is a relative shortage of workers with specialised skills 
to operate and maintain these machines. Sinkovics et al (2016) observe that automation has mainly led 
to a reduction in female workers, who are also typically less educated than males. Female 
employment declined from 80% to 61% of all workers in the formal garment sector between 2013 and 
2016, thanks to growing automation in the sector (Daily Star, 2018). Overall, female employment 
declined by 13% in the apparel sector, with a government report noting that ‘the major factors behind 
the declining trend of women employment was the closure of subcontracting in the garment sector 
after the Rana Plaza building collapse’ (Daily Star, 2017).  The manager of a firm noted that, ‘when 
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we are under pressure to reduce workers; it is normal that we release women first. Most are employed 
on a casual basis, and can easily be released’.  
Independent factories outside GVCs that rely on buying houses (and focused on clients who are 
primarily cost-conscious) are also under pressure to follow suit and reduce their engagement with 
non-compliant enterprises (and informal workers) as an awareness of substandard working conditions 
becomes commonplace. 
 
DISCUSSION: ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES FOR VULNERABLE ACTORS  
The mainstream view on MNEs and development has been that, on the whole, MNEs have a net 
positive effect on development, through a variety of means including employment, capital and 
knowledge flows, training, competition and demonstration effects (Narula & Dunning, 2010, Narula 
& Pineli, 2019). This may be so, but it is important to acknowledge that there are also adverse and 
unintended consequences (Giuliani & Macchi, 2014). Enforcing strict labour standards and full-chain 
compliance in a developing country where the economy is an intricate (and delicately balanced) 
network of informal and formal actors, and where the informal sector is economically and socially 
vulnerable, may be just such an instance.  
MNEs and their domestic suppliers are rarely hybrid organisations (Kannothra, Manning & Haigh, 
2018). They pursue social objectives only secondarily to financial goals. Practically speaking, 
achieving full-chain compliance is costly and MNEs have opted for a ‘cascading’ compliance as a 
cheaper alternative to full-chain responsibility. However, delegating enforcement to suppliers has 
been met with varying degrees of enthusiasm, given the associated costs. External stakeholders who 
monitor labour standards compliance (e.g., KnowTheChain, 2018) in GVCs find that few achieve 
effective full-chain compliance, especially in the lower tiers of their GVCs. As Sinkovics et al (2016) 
note, formal, lower-tier suppliers comply reluctantly. This is particularly so when it comes to the use 
of informal employees and subcontracting to informal enterprises. Undertaking the kinds of audits 
required for full compliance erodes their margins, even when they have the managerial capabilities to 
do so (Sinkovics et al, 2016). For informal enterprises, their ‘factories’ are so far removed from 
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oversight and operate on such small margins that compliance requirements crowds-out these informal 
enterprises (Posthuma & Nathan, 2010). Even when firms move to compliance, there can also be 
unintended negative consequences. Sinkovics et al (2016: 643) note that informal employees who 
have been ‘upgraded’ to formal status are not always pleased with the outcome: 
‘…at face value workers now receive a higher minimum wage, due to the abolition of overtime their 
total monthly income is reduced...Furthermore, workers still have to perform overtime to finish their 
often unrealistic daily quotas, but now without additional pay…As a result of the high cost of 
compliance …firms had also been forced to discontinue services such as free cooked lunches and 
prayer facilities that had been highly valued by the workers... there are no contingency plans for 
unskilled workers who have not only lost their jobs but are now excluded from the labour market.’  
The crowding-out of informal enterprises and informal employees from value chains has 
consequences for gender imbalance and development. The considerable growth in female 
employment in Bangladesh has been a positive outcome of the growth of the apparel industry. 
Although women working from home on small batches, or at informal enterprises are often exploited 
through long hours, unstable work, no benefits, and exclusion from union representation (BSR, 2017; 
Sikdar et al, 2014), these jobs have also lifted many out of absolute poverty. Formal firms employ 
armies of female workers as both formal and informal employees. At the same time, females are paid 
less than males, even in the formal sector, at the same levels of education and experience. Thus, while 
female access to employment has had considerable transformative potential for the welfare of women, 
this potential remains untapped because of the relative lack of more secure opportunities through 
formal employment and skills upgrading (Kabeer, 2016). Unskilled female workers are less likely to 
be offered formal employment, and are laid off first (Sinkovics et al, 2016). 
In sum, the drive towards higher labour standards has not been an unambiguously positive outcome 
for the most vulnerable actors in countries such as Bangladesh. Instead, it has restricted access for 
small-scale producers, informal enterprises and informal sub-contractors (and the largely female 
unskilled workers they employ) to GVCs, and effectively prevented smaller, informal firms from 
upgrading to higher value-added segments of industrial production. MNEs want to enforce labour 
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standards through mechanisms and audits based on internationally recognised codes, but these are 
most appropriate for factories mainly employing a formal, permanent and educated workforce 
(Mezzadri, 2014; Oxfam, 2010). 
 
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
From an IB theory perspective, it is worth noting that there is an inherent instability of GVC 
relationships. There is also a power asymmetry within MNE-led GVCs, where the lead firm is the 
orchestrator of the various actors, but its ability to orchestrate diminishes the more peripheral the actor 
is within the GVC. Full-chain compliance requires re-exerting control that the MNEs had previously 
relinquished. First tier suppliers, by virtue of their organisational proximity are more amenable to this, 
not only for obvious transaction reasons, but because the lead firm may provide access to FSAs, both 
technological, organizational and reputational (Kano, 2018). Lower tier firms do not have a similar 
expectation. 
Although the analysis offered here is tentative and is primarily intended to prompt debate, the 
reorganisation of GVCs towards full-chain accountability has implications for our understanding of 
the nature of the firm, and internalisation theory. The move from full vertical integration towards 
GVCs over the last 30 years reflected a shift in our conceptual understanding of the MNE as a firm 
where ownership and control were synonymous. The rise of the GVC and the growing use of non-
equity modes sparked a realisation that an MNE might engage in active control of offshore activities 
without ownership, suggesting that the ownership boundaries of the MNE did not have to reflect the 
control boundaries of the MNE (Buckley 2009; Strange & Humphrey 2019). By divesting ownership 
within the buyer-dominated GVC, but not control, MNEs reasonably expected that they had reduced 
(or no) culpability for the actions of their affiliated (but legally independent) GVC suppliers. This was 
all the more so in developing countries, where a large reliance on informal sector, means an even 
larger supplier network. The failure to achieve full-chain compliance demonstrates that there are 
limits to the MNE’s ability to control, because suppliers – both formal and informal - will act in their 
own self-interest when their relationship is purely economic. When the distribution of costs and rents 
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primarily benefits the MNE, with the supplier absorbing the greater part of the increased costs, it 
weakens the MNE’s capacity to control. This is counteracted when the supplier accrues non-pecuniary 
benefits from the MNE to compensate for the greater costs (for instance, knowledge transfers, or 
strategic opportunities to expand). Suppliers are boundedly reliable (Verbeke & Greidanus, 2009), 
which is to say, they are willing to cede control as long as their interests align with the MNE. Informal 
enterprises are in purely transactional, non-contractual, pecuniary relationships with the MNE or its 
formal suppliers, and thus the control boundaries of the MNE become even more tenuous and frail. 
The case of the Bangladeshi apparel sector indicates that while MNE ownership boundaries may have 
receded, there are limits to maintaining greater control boundaries. From an internalization theory 
perspective, the increased costs of full-chain responsibility erodes a key benefit of defragmenting the 
value chain, and the use of non-equity modes of internationalisation (Narula et al, 2019). 
Egels-Zandén (2017) proposes that in addition to ownership and control boundaries, we need to 
consider the importance of responsibility boundaries of the firm. The backlash in the wake of Rana 
Plaza indicates that stakeholders view the firm’s responsibility boundaries as stretching much further 
than either its ownership or control boundaries. These three boundaries have different spans (Narula et 
al, 2019). Mudambi & Puck (2016) argue that being accountable beyond its legal boundaries is part of 
the MNE’s role as the GVC orchestrator.  
Full-chain responsibility may only be achievable in an economy where the majority of the actors are 
formal, and state institutions are effective. In a dual economy, full-chain compliance means that what 
are essentially market relationships are also included within the responsibility boundary of the MNE. 
Can an MNE credibly orchestrate literally thousands of spot-market transactions, especially when 
they involve informal actors, and potentially the suppliers of those enterprises as well? It would seem 
that extended responsibility boundaries may accrue such high costs of monitoring and enforcement of 
such a large community of suppliers that it can potentially push MNEs and their key suppliers towards 
(higher) levels of vertical reintegration, and (at least a partial) realignment of ownership, control and 
responsibility boundaries. However, given that GVC lead firms have few sunk costs in the host 
country and are therefore ‘footloose’, it is more likely that, as compliance costs rise, they will seek 
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alternative locations that require lower compliance (or offer other cost-savings that compensate). 
Expanded responsibility boundaries require greater control, but how does MNEs achieve this in a 
GVC located within imperfectly functioning markets, and without legal recourse? A growing and 
renewed discourse around quasi-internalization (Narula et al, 2019) raises new questions of the 
yardstick by which we regard the ‘firm’ as a useful unit of analysis, with its multiple boundaries. The 
issues of shifting and multiple boundaries, and the propensity for MNEs to seek alternative 
configurations and locations deserve closer attention in future IB research. 
The ethical issues associated with locations offering low labour costs coupled with lax labour 
standards (and compliance requirements) as a primary location advantage are by no means novel, but 
have also largely been ignored (Maggioni, Santangelo & Koymen-Ozer, 2019). Most developing 
countries have multiple development goals, and few policy initiatives are without some adverse 
consequences. Governments prioritise certain preferred outcomes (such as reduced unemployment, or 
knowledge flows) and implicitly overlook negative ‘side effects’ on the principle of ‘the greatest good 
for the greatest number’.  
Full-chain responsibility requires regulation. MNEs are opportunistic by nature and are unlikely to 
effectively self-regulate. States are faced with twin challenges in enforcing hard regulation: resource 
constraints, and state capture. The capacity of civil society to effectively engage in this regulatory 
void by coercing firms to apply near-mandatory private regulation is a significant phenomenon in its 
own right, worthy of further study. It is not immediately obvious that private regulation can be a 
substitute for credible hard regulation, rather than complementary to it, given that NGOs do not have 
the capacity (or the authority) to audit or enforce.  
Private regulation also increases costs for actors within GVCs significantly, albeit unevenly. In most 
developed economies, the auditing and enforcement of labour standards are a public good. Should 
MNEs absorb the cost of public goods when institutional voids predominate? Hillemann & Verbeke 
(2016) feel that such engagement needs to be limited to where the MNE possesses the relevant FSAs, 
and to activities that further the strategic objectives of the MNE. It is not clear that the MNEs have the 
necessary FSAs in the apparel sector, evidenced by the fact that most rely on third parties to monitor 
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their suppliers. Outsourced monitoring further indicates that doing so internally is not aligned with 
MNE strategy. Public sector organisations and private investors answer to different stakeholders, and 
the interests of the latter rarely align with the former, and where they do so, this is through state 
capture. King & Lenox (2000) argue that opportunism eventually tends to overcome powerful self-
regulatory institutions and that effective industry self-regulation is difficult to maintain without 
explicit sanctions. 
That MNEs – whether intentionally or not – exacerbate significant socio-economic problems such as 
informality is worthy of greater scholarly interest. The lack of analysis reflects the paucity of data on 
the informal sector, and without reliable statistics it is hard to determine the net effect of MNE 
activity. Understanding social hierarchies and structures is a complex task, and a subject of 
considerable interest to sociology and development studies. MNEs have an outsized role as a source 
of employment, income and linkages in developing countries. How MNEs create opportunities for 
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1 This discussion is based on experiences particular to South Asian countries, and there may be some variation 
in other regions, reflecting different social and cultural networks.   
2 Weaker and less professionally managed firms have been acquired by those that are better managed.  A 
BGMEA official (an industry association) interviewed felt that in a few years’ time the apparel sector would 
have about 1000 firms. 
3 An interview with a BGMEA official suggested that about 200 have expanded towards yarn. Another 500 to 
600 produce fabric, not yarn. About 100 have forward integrated towards design. 
4 From an interview with a tier 1 manager: ‘…skilled people are needed. What we did was pick some from the 
existing labour force who were a bit more educated and impart them with in-house training to…operate the 
automated machines. But there were some boys and girls whose education was below a certain level…not 
adequate to train them for the new machines. They had to go.’ 
